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COMMENTS
FEDERAL

INCOME

TAXATION-ACCOUNTING

METHODS-AC-

COUNTING FOR PREPAYMENTS AND ESTIMATED FUTURE EXPENSES-

"It is the essence of any system of taxation that it should produce
revenue ascertainable, and payable to the government, at regular
intervals."1 In order to obtain regular periodic revenues from the
federal income tax, Congress requires all taxpayers to determine
their taxable income annually. 2
Income may be defined as "value added" as a result of a given
economic activity. 3 Logically, the most opportune time to measure
income occurs whenever that activity has ended, for at that time
the continuous growth or contraction in the attributable value will
likewise have ended and the income or loss from the activity will
be readily susceptible to measurement. The fragmentation of this
period of activity into an annual period, as demanded by Congress,
requires an attempt to measure a continuously changing quantum
of income. Business activity does not cease and begin anew at the
end of each taxable year; thus, some transactions will necessarily
span such artificial limits. Consequently, the determination of taxable income requires the implementation of accounting methods
which will wholly or partially exclude or include such transactions
in the current taxable year.
The need for yearly accounting may also arise apart from tax
considerations. Reports of annual business income are required by
government agencies,4 stock exchanges,° and shareholders. 6 In adStone, J., in Burnet v. Sanford &: Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359, 365 (1931).
INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 44l(a).
"The net worth method of estimating taxable income is a logical derivation of the
net accretion definition of income••••" Morag, Some Economic Aspects of Two Administrative Methods of Estimating Taxable Income, 10 NAT'L TAX J. 176, 179 (1957). See
generally Avakian, Net Worth Computations as Proof of Tax Evasion, 10 TAX L. R.Ev.
431 (1955).
4 See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933 § 7, Schedule A § 26, 48 Stat. 88, 90, 15
U.S.C. §§ 77g, 77aa(26) (1958); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(a), 48 Stat. 894,
15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1958); Interstate Commerce Act § 20(1)-(3), 54 Stat. 916 (1940),
as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 20(1)-(3) (1958); Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 407(a), 72 Stat.
766, 49 U.S.C. § 1377(a) (1958); Omo R.Ev. CODE ANN. § 1701.38 (Page Supp. 1961). Many
government agencies may promulgate uniform rules of accounting to be used in filing
annual reports. See, e.g., Interstate Commerce Act § 20(3), 54 Stat. 916 (1940), 49 U.S.C.
§ 20(3) (1958).
Ii NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, COMPANY MANUAL § A4 (1953).
6 See generally BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS §§ 159-61 (1946); 2 HORNSTEIN, CoRPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 612 (1959).
1
2
3
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dition, the level of annual income is the most important influence
on the management of business operations7 and the determination
of financial policies. 8 In the business community, the responsibility
for the formation and application of accounting methods has been
generally entrusted to professional accountants. After an unsuccessful attempt to measure business income with accounting methods
based on cash receipts and disbursements, Congress expanded the
permissible tax accounting methods to allow accrual accounting,
the method used by professional accountants.9 However, as a control measure Congress gave the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
the right to reject any method of accounting which did not clearly
reflect income.10 While a determination of taxable income made
according to generally accepted accounting principles has usually
been allowed for tax purposes, the Commissioner has consistently
rejected such determinations when they have involved prepaid income or estimated future expenses.11
The widely divergent views held by the Internal Revenue
Service and professional accountants in regard to the proper accounting treatment for these types of transactions have resulted
in a substantial amount of litigation, which began soon after the
adoption of the accrual method of accounting for tax purposes.
However, this litigation has not clearly defined acceptable methods
of tax accounting for prepaid income and estimated future expenses. Instead, it has seemingly rendered the question incapable
of resolution in the absence of an articulate redefinition of the
applicable accounting provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.12
Since the fulfillment of this objective apparently requires a choice
between the methods advocated by the accounting profession and
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the initial step toward
suc:.h a redefinition lies in an investigation of the relative merits
of their proposals.
1 PATON &: PATON, CORPORATION ACCOUNTS AND STATEMENTS 275 (1955).
8 1 DEWING, FINANCIAL PoLICY OF CORPORATIONS 509-10, 519-20, 530-34 (5th ed. 1953).
9

Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463 § I3(d), 39 Stat. 756 [now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,

§ 446(c)].
10 Revenue Act of 1916,

ch. 463 § 13(d), 39 Stat. 756 [now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§ 446(b)]. See H.R. REP. No. 922, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1916).

11 See Rev. Rul. 85, 1960-1 CUM. BULL. 181; l P-H 1962 FED. TAX SERv. ,r,f 6282-90,
6453.
12 Krahmer, Taxation of Prepaid Receipts-Ambiguity of Supreme Court Decision
in American Automobile Association v. United States Expected To Cause Further Confusion, 47 A.B.A.J. 1218, 1221 (1961).
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GENERALLY ACCEPTED AccOUNTING STANDARDS FOR PREPAID
1NCOME13 AND ESTIMATED FUTURE EXPENSES14

A professional accountant defines "income" as a net or resultant amount determined by matching revenues15 with related expenses.16 Income, so defined, does not exist prior to the sale of
goods or performance of services.17 Payments received prior to
performance, which have been denominated as "prepaid income,"
are regarded simply as advance deposits. 18 The advance of cash
is treated as creating a debt obligation running from the seller
to the advancing purchaser for the full amount received. 19 Normally this obligation will be discharged by the delivery of goods
or the rendition of services. When this occurs, the accountant will
include the amount of the deposit in the stream of revenues which
are included in the current determination of income.20 Such an
accounting procedure has the effect of deferring recognition of the
monies advanced until they have been actually earned.21 Thus,
13 The term "prepaid income" is derived from the title of § 452 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 repealed by ch. 143 § 1, 69 Stat. 134 (1955). Other terms com•
monly used to describe such transactions are deferred revenues, deferred credits, and
advances from customers. See FINNEY 8: MILLER, PRINCIPLES OF ACCOUNTING, INTRODUC•
TORY 367 (5th ed. 1957) [hereinafter cited as FINNEY]; LENHART 8: DEFLIESE, MONTGOM•
ERY'S AUD111NG 327 (8th ed. 1957): PATON, EssENTIALS OF ACCOUNTING, 313-15 (rev. ed.
1949) [hereinafter cited as PATON].
14 The term "estimated future expenses" is derived from the title of § 462 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 repealed by ch. 143 § 1, 69 Stat. 134 (1955).
15 Revenue may be defined as the amount of cash, receivables, or other valid assets
added to the resources of the business as a result of transferring products to customers.
PATON 77.
16 FINNEY 367. This definition has also been used by the courts. See United States
v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 422, 440 (1926); Bressner Radio, Inc. v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d
520, 523 (2d Cir. 1959), nonacq., Rev. Rul. 85, 1960-1 CUM. BULL. 181; Beacon Publishing
Co. v. Commissioner, 218 F.2d 697, 699 (10th Cir. 1955). But cf. Burnet v. Sanford 8:
Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359 (1931); Spencer, White 8: Prentis, Inc. v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d
45, 47' (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 780 (1944).
17 PATON 77-78.
18 PATON 313-15.
10 FINNEY 361; PATON 46-47, 312-16. "The term current liabilities is used principally
to designate obligations whose liquidation is reasonably expected to require the use of
existing resources properly classifiable as current assets, or the creation of other current
liabilities • • • • [T]he classification is intended to include • • • collections received in
advance of the delivery of goods or performance of services • • • ." CoMMilTEE ON AcCOUNTING PROCEDURE, AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, ACCOUNTING
REsEARCH BULLETIN No. 43, 21-22 (1953). But see LENHART 8: DEFLIESE, op. cit. supra
note 13, at 327, "Current liabilities should include the portion of these deferred credits
equal to the estimated cost of realizing such reve~ues in the following period. The
remaining portion of unearned revenues, representmg profit, may be excluded from
current liabilities and designated as deferred income." (Emphasis supplied.)
20 FINNEY 367; PATON 312-16.
21

Ibid.
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the accountant recognizes the revenues as earned in the year in
which the seller has performed, regardless of the time when payment was actually received. This accounting treatment acknowledges income as being earned only after the risk of performing the
obligation required by the pertinent sales contract has been terminated and the cost of performance accurately ascertained. On
the other hand, it prevents the recognition as income of advances
from customers which may have to be returned because of the
seller's inability to perform as required by the sales contract.22
The professional accountant recognizes estimated future expenses when the current performance of a contract to deliver goods
or render services creates an incidental obligation in the seller which
may require him to incur additional expenses at some future time.
Instead of deferring the recognition of a portion of the revenue from
the sale transaction until such time as the future expenses are incurred, accepted accounting procedures require inclusion of the
total revenue in the current determination of income when the
contract has been substantially performed, and the simultaneous
deduction of all the related expenses, including a reasonable estimate for future expenses.23 The obligation to incur future expense
is then treated as a current liability which will be discharged when
the expense is incurred.24 Unlike other current liabilities, obligations to incur estimated future expenses may be accrued although
there may be no certain sums owed to specific persons.25 Common
examples of estimated future expenses involve obligations arising
under agreements to provide free services on the seller's products
and agreements to install goods on the buyer's premises. However,
it is essential that the expenses accrued be related to the current
production of revenues. 26 Accordingly, deductions from current
revenues normally are not allowed for the estimated cost of future
22
23
24
25

FINNEY 309; PATON 315.
FINNEY 309, 367; PATON 352; LENHART & DEFLIESE, op. cit. supra note
FINNEY 309; PATON & PATON, op. cit. supra note 7, at 414.
FINNEY & OLDBERG, LAWYER'S GUIDE TO ACCOUNTING 165 (1955). "This

13, at 329.

concept of
current liabilities would include estimated or accrued amounts which are expected to
be required to cover expenditures within the year for known obligations (a) the amount
of which can be determined only approximately (as in the case of provisions for
accruing bonus payments) or (b) where the specific person or persons to whom payment
will be made cannot as yet be designated (as in the case of estimated costs to be
incurred in connection with guaranteed servicing or repair of products already sold)."
CoMMITl"EE ON ACCOUNTING PROCEDURE, op. cit. supra note 19, at 22.
26 FINNEY 367.
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fire losses, or future strikes. 27 Generally accepted accounting principles also make no allowance for the deduction of future expenses
which cannot be estimated with reasonable accuracy, even if related to current production of revenues. 28 As an example, prospective losses arising due to injuries sustained by the purchaser of a
defective product normally may not be deducted in the year the
article was produced.
An alternative to deducting estimated future expenses would
be to defer recognition of that portion of current receipts which
corresponds to the cost of providing the future services.29 Thus,
when a product is sold under an agreement to provide free maintenance services for a given period, the portion of the current receipts from the sale which represents the amount the seller would
charge for such service would be excluded from the determination
of income until the service is rendered. 30 In short, this alternative
procedure would treat a portion of the current revenue from such
sales as "prepaid income."
While it is often said that the same result can be achieved using
either method,31 this statement is only a half-truth. Although it
is true that either procedure will result in matching revenues with
related expenses, the matching, and therefore the recognition of
income, will often take place in different taxable years. For example, where future services are required in a sales contract, if
estimated future expenses are deducted, all income from the sale
is recognized in the year the product is sold. If the alternative
procedure of deferring a portion of the receipts is adopted, a portion of the income will be deferred to the year or years in which
the services are rendered.
Thus, deferring a portion of current revenues is an alternative
to deducting estimated future expenses where the future obliga27 CoMMI1TEE ON ACCOUNTING PROCEDURE, AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC
ACCOUNTANTS, ACCOUNTING REsEARCH BULLETIN No. 53 § 7(a) (1958); PATON 746.
28 See CoMMI1TEE ON ACCOUNTING PROCEDURE, op. cit. supra note 27, § 7(e): "The
Committee is therefore of the opinion that reserves such as those created ••• in amounts
not determined on the basis of any reasonable estimates of costs or losses are of such a
nature that charges or credits relating to such reserves should not enter into the deter•
mination of net income."
29 PATON &: PATON, op. cit. supra note 7, at 340-45. See, e.g., Bressner Radio, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 267 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1959), nonacq., Rev. Rul. 85, 1960-1 CuM. BULL. 181.
so Ibid.
31 See, e.g., Olincy, Taxability and Deductibility of Prepaid Income and Expense,
U. So. CAL. 1961 TAX INsr. 415, 434.
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tions are incidental to the contract for goods or services. On the
other hand, generally accepted accounting principles require the
deferring of advance payments absent the current performance of
such contract. 32 In such a case, the obligation to incur future expenses would not be incidental to current operations. For this
reason, attempts to manipulate the periodic determination of income by deducting the estimated cost of the goods sold or services
rendered from payments made in advance in order to recognize
the income from the transaction before it has been earned by the
performance of the contract are disfavored by professional accountants.

II.

TAX

AccoUNTING STANDARDS FOR PREPAID INCOME AND
ESTIMATED FUTURE EXPENSES

The Internal Revenue Code allows taxpayers to determine
their taxable income according to the method of accounting regularly used in keeping their books, provided the method used clearly
reflects income.33 Since the essence of the accrual method of accounting is the determination of income by matching revenues
and expenses,34 taxpayers using that method determine taxable
income by deducting from gross income35 the expenses attributable
to the earning of that income during the taxable year. The
Internal Revenue Code provides:
"The amount of any item of gross income shall be included
in the gross income for the taxable year in which received by
the taxpayer, unless, under the method of accounting used in
computing taxable income, such amount is to be properly
accounted for as of a different period. 36 ••• The amount of any
deduction or credit allowed ... shall be taken for the taxable
year which is the proper taxable year under the method of
accounting used in computing taxable income." 37
Under these Code provisions, the proper time for the inclusion of
receipts and the deduction of expenses is largely controlled by the
method of accounting used by the taxpayer. It would seem, there32
33
34

35
36
37

Authorities cited notes 24, 26 8e 27 supra.
INT. REV. CoDE OF 1954, § 446.
United States v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 422, 440 (1926). See also FINNEY 367.
For an applicable definition of gross income, see INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 61.
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 45l(a).
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 46l(a).
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fore, that a taxpayer using the accrual method should, as discussed in the preceding section, defer prepayments until the taxable year in which the related obligation to deliver goods or render
services is discharged; likewise, estimated future expenses should
be deductible in the taxable year in which the related revenues are
included in the computation of taxable income. However, both
of these generally accepted accounting procedures have been rejected by the Commissioner on the ground that they do not clearly
reflect income.38 Consequently, taxpayers are required to include
prepayments in the computation of taxable income when they are
received, and are denied the right to deduct future expenses which
are related to the current production of taxable income.89 To substantiate this position, the Commissioner has resorted to four basic
and rather separate contentions.

A. The "Taxable Year" Concept
At first, the rejection of taxpayers' attempts to match revenues
with related expenses through the use of professional accounting
procedures was based on the Treasury's concept of the annual
accounting period.40 It was felt that any attempt to match revenues
and related expenses not occurring in the same taxable year was
a departure from a periodic determination of income.41 The rule
that income should not be determined on a transaction basis received its first approval in Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co.,42 a
case in which the taxpayer had entered into an unprofitable dredging contract. After completion of the work, however, the taxpayer
sued for breach of warranty as to a certain aspect of the job and
recovered the losses it had suffered during the prior three 'years.
The Court held that the taxpayer could not amend prior returns
38 Rev. Rul. 85, 1960-1 CuM. BuLL. 181 (prepaid income); 3 CCH 1962 STAND. Fm. TAX
REP. ,i 2916.08 (estimated future expenses). But cf. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 455, 456;
Rev. Rul. 446, 1955-2 CuM. BuLL. 531 (allowing accrual of bonuses); Rev. Rul. 608,
1954-2 CUM. BULL. 8 (allowing accrual of vacation pay).
39 Ibid.
40 Ch. 852, § 41, 45 Stat. 805 (1928) (now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 441).
41 Heiner v. Mellon, 304 U.S. 271 (1938); Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S.
359 (1931); Spencer, White & Prentis, Inc. v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 45 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 323 U.S. 780 (1944); Blum v. Helvering, 74 F.2d 482 (D.C. Cir. 1934). But cf.
American Automobile Ass'n v. United States, 367 U.S. 687, 701 (1961) (dissenting opinion);
Harrold v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 1002, 1006 (4th Cir. 1951). See also Krahmer, Taxation
of Advance Receipts for Future Services, 1961 DuKE L.J. 230, 242.
42 282 U.S. 359 (1931).
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to offset the losses sustained under the contract with the income
received from the damage award. Properly construed, however,
this case merely prevents the matching of losses and earnings derived from a transaction in different tax.able years; 43 it does not
apply to the matching of revenues and expenses. Further clarification was necessary in order to apply this doctrine to the proper
allocation of expenses and revenues.44
B. The "All Events" Rule

The Commissioner's second ground for the rejection of professional accounting standards for prepayments and estimated future
expenses was based on the so-called "all events" rule. 45 This rule,
as originally formulated, called for the inclusion of revenues in the
tax.able year in which all the events have occurred which are necessary to fix their amount and the tax.payer's right to receive them; 46
in like manner, the deduction of expenses must be postponed until
the tax.able year in which all the events have occurred which are
necessary to establish the fact and the amount of the tax.payer's
liability.47 When this rule is applied to prepaid income, it would
seem that all the events necessary to determine the tax.payer's right
to such prepayments have not occurred until they have been
"earned" in the accounting sense-a position contrary to that
taken by the Commissioner.48
Although completely disregarding the "all events" rule in the
case of prepaid income, the Commissioner has successfully used it
to bolster his position with respect to estimated future expenses.49
Early cases before the Board of Tax Appeals denied deduction for
these items on the ground that all the events necessary to determine
Goodhue, Claim of Right and Changes in Accounting Method, N.Y.U. 18TH !Nsr.
FED. TAX 209, 213-14 (1960); Krahmer, supra note 41, at 243-45.
44 Harrold v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 1002, 1006 (4th Cir. 1951).
411 See United States v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 422, 441 (1926).
46 Treas. Reg. § 1.446-l(c)l(ii) (1957).
47 United States v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 422, 441 (1926); Treas. Reg. § 1.446-l(c)l(ii)
(1957).
48 Bressner Radio, Inc. v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 520, 524 (2d Cir. 1959), nonacq.,
Rev. Rul. 85, 1960-1 CuM. BULL. 181.
40 See, e.g., New Capitol Hotel, Inc. v. Commissioner, 261 F.2d 437 (6th Cir. 1958),
affirming per curiam 28 T.C. 706 (1957); Hirsch Improvement Co. v. Commissioner, 143
F.2d 912 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 750 (1944); Clay Sewer Pipe Ass'n v. Commis•
sioner, 139 F.2d 130 (3d Cir.), affirming 1 T.C. 529 (1943); South Dade Farms, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 138 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1943); Automobile Club of N.Y., Inc., 32 T.C.
906 (1959); National Airlines, Inc., 9 T.C. 159 (1947).
43

ON
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the amount of the expense and the fact of the taxpayer's liability
had not yet occurred. In Uvalde Co.,50 the taxpayer had paved certain streets under a contract which required him to maintain them
for a period of several years. The taxpayer, computing taxable income by the accrual method, included revenues from the transaction in gross income and deducted an estimate of the future
maintenance expenses. The Board denied the deduction because
no liability for any expense had been incurred within the taxable
year. A mere contractual obligation to perform services in the
future does not meet the "all events" test; payment, or a specific
obligation to pay for the services, is required. In addition, the fact
that the obligation to incur expense in the future was contingent
provided the Board with an alternative ground for decision. Under
either approach, application of the "all events" rule in this context
has effectively denied taxpayers the right to deduct estimated
future expenses in the taxable year in which related revenues were
included in the computation of taxable income.
Since its inception, the "all events" rule has been modified to
the extent that a deduction will be allowed in the year in which
all the events necessary to establish the fact of the liability have
occurred, provided the amount of the liability can be estimated
with reasonable accuracy. 51 However, there has been no change
in the treatment of estimated future expenses by the Tax Court or
the Commissioner. This was demonstrated in National Bread
Wrapping Mach. Co.,52 where the taxpayer sold machinery to
be installed on the purchaser's premises during the subsequent
taxable year. The taxpayer reported all revenue from the transaction and deducted a reasonable estimate for the prospective installation costs. The deduction was disallowed on the ground that
all the events necessary to determine the fact of liability would not
occur until the services were performed giving rise to the obligation to pay for the labor used in installing the machinery. Thus,
the requirement of an existing obligation to pay money as distinguished from an obligation to perform services is still applied
by the Commissioner and the Tax Court to deny a deduction for
estimated future expenses. However, the distinction between money
obligations and performance obligations has not received consist50
51
52

1 B.T.A. 932 (1925).
Treas. Reg. § I.461-l(a)(2) (1957).
30 T.C. 550 (1958).
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ent application by the various courts of appeals. 53 In Harrold v.
Commissioner, 54 the taxpayer operated a strip coal mine. Mining
laws required him to refill the area excavated to reach the coal. Although the backfilling operations would not commence until a
future taxable year, the taxpayer deducted an estimate of the backfilling expense attributable to current operations. The Commissioner's disallowance was sustained by the Tax Court because the
petitioner had not incurred any liability in the taxable year for
the payment of amounts required to refill the excavation. 55 On
appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed. All
the events necessary to determine the fact of the taxpayer's liability
had occurred in the taxable year and the amount of the liability
could be estimated with reasonable accuracy. The court did not
address itself to the distinction between a performance obligation
and an obligation to pay money.
It should be observed that the future performance obligation
in Harrold was not contingent; therefore, the reasons relied on by
the Tax Court in Uvalde Co. were not fully contravened. The
question of whether the cost of contingent future performance
obligations should be deductible is of utmost importance in accounting for estimated future expenses. Contingent future performance obligations include new product warranties and other
service obligations undertaken in connection with the sale of
goods, obligations which might well provide significant deductions,
if allowed. While it is impossible to estimate the future expense
associated with the sale of a single product, the aggregate future
expenses associated with the sale of many articles of the same type
can often be estimated with remarkable accuracy. 56 However, if
the form of the transaction, rather than its substance, is to control the deductibility of estimated future expenses from contingent
future obligations, the taxpayer will have to convince the Com53 Compare Denise Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 930 (3d Cir. 1959); Schuessler
v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 722 (5th Cir. 1956); Pacific Grape Prod. Co. v. Commissioner,
219 F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 1955); Harrold v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1951),
with Central Cuba Sugar Co. v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 214 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344
U.S. 874 (1952); Capital Warehouse Co. v. Commissioner, 171 F.2d 395 (8th Cir. 1948);
Spencer, White & Prentis, Inc. v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 45 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323
U.S. 750 (1944); Amalgamated Housing Corp. v. Commissioner, 108 F.2d 1010 (2d Cir.
1940), affirming per curiam 37 B.T.A. 817 (1938).
54 192 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1951).
r,5 Paul Harrold, 16 T.C. 134 (1951).
uO See Ocean Acc. & Guar. Corp. v. Commissioner, 47 F.2d 582, 584 (2d Cir. 1931).
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missioner and the courts that a liability has been incurred although
the obligation to perform may be contingent. Under the "all
events" rule, the Commissioner has successfully asserted his contention that a contingent future performance obligation does not
establish the fact of the taxpayer's liability until the contingency
has been resolved.117 Under this view, the future expense of such
obligations would not be deductible. On the other hand, it may be
argued that all the events necessary to establish the fact of the taxpayer's liability have occurred when he has agreed to render a
contingent future performance, and the contingency merely makes
the amount of the liability less susceptible to estimation with
reasonable accuracy. This view, if accepted, would permit the
deduction of future performance obligations provided they could
be estimated with reasonable accuracy.
In Milwaukee &- Suburban Transp. Corp. 58 the Tax Court sustained the Commissioner's disallowance of a deduction for the
estimated future expenses from personal injury claims which arose
from the operation of its buses during the taxable year. In doing
so, the court reviewed the accuracy with which individual claims
were estimated notwithstanding the taxpayer's argument that the
amount deducted reflected the aggregate claims expense with
reasonable accuracy. However, the Milwaukee case involved disputed liabilities rather than contingent obligations such as sales
warranties (where the taxpayer's liability is admitted). The deductibility of disputed liabilities has been frequently discussed in connection with deductions for estimated future expenses, although
they are clearly distinguishable. It is reasonable to deny the taxpayer the right to deduct amounts which in good faith he does not
believe he will incur as expenses. 59 In addition, it has been suggested that allowing the deduction of disputed liabilities would
encourage the manipulation of the year in which taxable income
is reported. 60 Therefore, it is suggested that there are sufficient in-

.

Streight Radio & T.V., Inc. v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 127 (1959), af/'d on other
grounds, 280 F.2d 883 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 965 (1961). Cf. American
Automobile Ass'n v. United States, 367 U.S. 687, 692 (1961).
58 28 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 904 (1959).
59 See, e.g., Security Flour Mills Co. v. Commissioner, 321 U.S. 281, 284 (1944); Dixie
Pine Prods. Co. v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 516 (1944). Cf. Consolidated Edison Co. v.
United States, 279 F.2d 152, 157 (2d Cir. 1960), af/'d, 366 U.S. 380 (1961), 60 MICH. L. REv.
383 (1962).
60 See Consolidated Edison Co. v. United States, supra note 59, at 157; Powell, New
Developments in Accruals, N.Y.U. 19TH: lNsr. ON FED. TAX 1337, 1357-58 (1961).
57
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dependent reasons for finding that all the events necessary to
establish the fact of the taxpayer's disputed liability cannot be
established until the dispute has been resolved. But the decision
in Milwaukee and other disputed liability cases should not necessarily conclude the taxpayer's right to aggregate admitted obligations in order that the future expenses may be estimated with
reasonable accuracy.

C. The "Claim of Right" Doctrine
Thirdly, the Internal Revenue Service turned to the "claim of
right" doctrine to justify the Commissioner's contention that prepayments must be included in the computation of taxable income
for the year received, even though they are not earned until a
subsequent taxable year. 61 The claim of right doctrine, which
originated in North Am. Oil Consol. v. Burnet, 62 requires a taxpayer who has received earnings under a claim of right and without restriction as to their disposition to report them as taxable income in the year in which they were received even though he may
still be required to restore their equivalent. In the North Am. Oil
case, the taxpayer had received income which it would have to
restore if it could not successfully defend its title to the land from
which the income was derived. The taxpayer prevailed in the title
dispute and claimed the income should be reported in the taxable
year in which the suit was settled. The Supreme Court held the
income was properly reported in the taxable year in which it was
received. Two years later, in Brown v. Helvering, 63 the Court
further refined the claim of right doctrine by denying a taxpayer
the right to deduct an estimate of the income he might have to
restore. In both of these cases, it was clear that the claim of right
doctrine was used to determine the proper period for reporting net
income. Thus, this is not authority for the proposition that the
mere receipt of a prepayment determines its year of inclusion. 64
61 See, e.g., New Capitol Hotel v. Commissioner, 261 F.2d 437 (6th Cir. 1958), affi,rming
per curiam 28 T.C. 706 (1957); Hirsch Improvement Co. v. Commissioner, 143 F.2d 912
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 750 (1944); Clay Sewer Pipe Ass'n v. Commissioner,
139 F.2d ll!0 (3d Cir.), affi,rming l T.C. 529 (1943); South Dade Farms, Inc. v. Commis•
sioner, 138 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1943); Automobile Club of N.Y., Inc., 32 T.C. 906 (1959);
National Airlines, Inc., 9 T.C. 159 (1947).
62 286 U.S. 417 (1932).
as 291 U.S. 193 (1934).
64 Bressner Radio, Inc. v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 520, 525 (2d Cir. 1959), nonacq.,
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However, the Commissioner and the Tax Court have relied upon
the claim of right doctrine to require the inclusion of prepayments
in the taxable year of receipt. In E. B. Elliott Co.,65 the Board of
Tax Appeals required the taxpayer to "include prepaid rentals in
its current determination of taxable income on the ground that
the taxpayer had the unrestricted use of the cash received. The
Board did not recognize the offsetting liability of the taxpayer to
perform its obligation or restore the money advanced. In Wallace
A. Moritz, 66 the Tax Court required the taxpayer, a professional
photographer, to include deposits on picture orders in his determination of taxable income for the year in which they were received. The deposits were to be refunded if the customers did not
accept the finished pictures. Again the court relied on the claim
of right doctrine~ indicating that the taxpayer had the unrestricted
use of the funds deposited.
While the Tax Court has continued to rely on the claim of
right doctrine, courts of appeals have not consistently applied it
in prepaid income cases. 67 In Beacon Publishing Co. v. Commissioner,68 the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the
Tax Court's decision which had required the taxpayer to include
prepaid newspaper subscriptions in taxable income for the year
in which they were received. The court held the claim of right
doctrine was not applicable to prepayments because there was no
dispute as to the ownership of the funds. 69 It was recognized that
acceptance of the claim of right ,doctrine would require the taxpayer to report prepayments as if he were using the cash receipts
Rev. Rul. 85, 1960-1 CuM. BULL. 181; Beacon Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 218 F.2d
697, 700 (10th Cir. 1955). Cf. American Automobile Ass'n v. United States, 367 U.S. 687,
700 (1961) (dissenting opinion); Automobile Club v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180, 191
(1957) (dissenting opinion). See Goodhue, supra note 43, at 232.
45 B.T.A. 82 (1941).
21 T.C. 622 (1954).
Compare Schlude v. Commissioner, 283 F.2d 234 (8th Cir. 1960), rev'd per curiam,
367 U.S. 911, modified, 368 U.S. 873 (1961); Bressner Radio, Inc. v. Commissioner, 267
F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1959), nonacq., Rev. Rul. 85, 1960-1 CUM. BULL. 181; Beacon Publishing
Co. v. Commissioner, 218 F.2d 6r;t/ (10th Cir. 1955), with Streight Radio & T.V., Inc. v.
Commissioner, 280 F.2d 883 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 965 (1961); New Capitol
Hotel v. Commissioner, 261 F.2d 437 (6th Cir. 1958), afferming per curiam 28 T.C. 706
(1957); Hirsch Improvement Co. v. Commissioner, 143 F.2d 912 (2d Cir.), cert denied,
323 U.S. 750 (1944); Clay Sewer Pipe Ass'n v. Commissioner, 139 F.2d 130 (3d Cir.),
afferming 1 T.C. 529 (1943); South Dade Farms, Inc. v. Commissioner, 138 F.2d 818 (5th
Cir. 1943).
68 218 F.2d 697 (10th Cir. 1955).
69 Beacon Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 218 F.2d 697, 700 (10th Cir. 1955).
65
66
67
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and disbursements method of accounting, although actually using
the accrual method, thereby creating a hybrid accounting system
which would not clearly reflect income.70 The claim of rightdoctrine as advanced by the Commissioner received a further setback in Bressner Radio, Inc. v. Commissioner71 when the court
allowed the taxpayer to exclude prepayments received from the
sale of repair services from its current determination of income.
The court limited the claim of right doctrine to the situation in
which it arose: the determination of the taxable year in which
earned income must be reported. The court reviewed the decision in North Am. Oil and concluded that the Supreme Court
"held only that money that was earned and held under a claim of
right was includible in the year of receipt." 72
The Commissioner's contention that the claim of right doctrine required the inclusion of prepayments in the computation
of taxable income when received was placed before the Supreme
Court in Automobile Club v. Commissioner,73 where the taxpayer
sought to reverse a Sixth Circuit decision which had relied on that
doctrine to require the inclusion of prepaid membership dues. 74
The Court affirmed the decision, but in doing so, it disregarded
the claim of right doctrine on which the Commissioner had relied.
Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting, stated:
"The Commissioner seeks to justify that course [the inclusion
of prepayments] under the 'claim of right' doctrine announced
in North American Oil v. Burnet .... However, that doctrine,
it seems to me, comes into play only in determining whether
the treatment of an item of income should be influenced by
the fact that the right to receive or keep it is in dispute....
The Court, however, now bypasses the Commissioner's 'claim
of right' argument, and rests its decision instead on the ground
that the pro rata allocation of the membership dues in monthly
amounts is purely artificial." 75
Yet, after the Automobile Club decision, the claim of right doctrine continued to be applied in both the Tax Court76 and the
70
71
72
73
M
75
76

Id. at 701.
267 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1959), nonacq., Rev. Rul. 85, 1960-1 CuM. BULL, 181.
Bressner Radio, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra note 71, at 525.
353 U.S. 180 (1957).
Automobile Club v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 585 (6th Cir. 1956).
Automobile Club v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180, 191-93 (1957). (Emphasis added.)
Automobile Club of N.Y., Inc., 32 T.C. 906 (1959).
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courts of appeals. 77 In American Automobile Ass'n v. Commissioner,78 the Supreme Court took a second look at the problem.
Again, the Court required inclusion of prepayments in the computation of taxable income when received without indicating
reliance upon the claim of right doctrine. This was carefully
presented in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart, where
it was said:
"The Commissioner's basic argument against the deferred
reporting of prepayments has traditionally been that such a
method conflicts with a series of decisions of this Court which
establish the so-called 'claim of right doctrine.' In this case
the Government abandoned that argument with good reason.
As four Circuits have correctly held, the claim of right doctrine furnishes no support for the Government's position.
. . . A claim of right without 'restriction on .use' may be
the crucial factor in determining that particular funds are
includable in gross income . ... But it hardly follows that
all such funds must necessarily be reported by an accrual
basis taxpayer as income in the year of receipt, whether or
not then earned." 79
Thus, it is possible that the Commissioner may have finally abandoned the claim of right doctrine with respect to prepayments.
It is hoped that the Commissioner will act consistently and not
reassert the claim of right doctrine in cases before those lower
courts which have previously applied it to require the inclusion
of prepayments when received. In this manner, it may be possible
to obtain some uniformity of judicial thought on a correct basis
for the inclusion or exclusion of such advances.

D.

The Automobile Club Decision

In both the Automobile Club and American Automobile Ass'n
cases the taxpayer had received prepayments in consideration for
77 Streight Radio &: T.V., Inc. v. Commissioner, 280 F.2d 883 (7th Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 366 U.S. 965 (1961).
78 367 U.S. 687 (1961).
79 Id. at 699, 700. (Emphasis added.) Circuit court decisions cited with approval were
Schlude v. Commissioner, 283 F.2d 234 (8th Cir. 1960); Bressner Radio, Inc. v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1959); Schuessler v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 722 (5th Cir.
1956); Beacon Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 218 F.2d 697 (10th Cir. 1955).
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future services, including some services which would be performed
upon the happening of a contingency. Each taxpayer prorated
the prepayment over the period during which he might be obligated to render services, and included the portion allocated to the
current year in its computation of taxable income. In Automobile Club, the Court concluded that the Commissioner had not
exceeded his authority because "the pro rata allocation of the
membership dues in monthly amounts is purely artificial and
bears no relation to the services which petitioner may in fact be
called upon to render for the member." 80 Thus, the Automobile
Club decision provided the Commissioner with a fourth basis to
support his contention that prepayments must be included in taxable income for the year of receipt. It should be noted that the
Court distinguished Beacon Publishing and Schuessler v. Commissioner,81 indicating that it did not wish to pass upon the more
difficult question presented where the time of future performance
can be accurately determined. Consequently, it may be argued
that the decision would sustain the Commissioner's position only
in cases involving future obligations so contingent that the year
of performance cannot be accurately determined. However, in
Bressner Radio, Inc., 82 which also involved contingent future
obligations, the Second Circuit rejected the Commissioner's argument that Automobile Club was dispositive of the case at bar.
The court found that the taxpayer's deferral of prepayments "bore
a carefully estimated relationship to the services petitioner would
be called upon to render." 83 Thus, it seemed that Automobile
Club decision might not apply if the taxpayer could prove that the
deferral of prepayments was not "artificial." The Government
indicated it would not follow the Bressner decision. 84 In American
Automobile Ass'n the Supreme Court granted certiorari85 in order
to resolve the apparent conflict between Bressner and the decision of the Court of Claims which had sustained the Commissioner's rejection of the Association's method of accounting. 86 The
Supreme Court affirmed the decision below, relying on its earlier
Automobile Club v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180, 189 (1957).
2!!0 F.2d 722 (5th Cir. 1956).
267 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1959). See text at notes 71, 72 supra.
as Id. at 529.
84 Rev. Rul. 85, 1960·1 CUM. BuLL. 181.
811 364 U.S. 813 (1960).
86 181 F. Supp. 255 (Ct. Cl. 1960).

80
81
82
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decision in Automobile Club. Although the taxpayer had sought
to show that its correlation of cost and the period of deferral was
justified by "proof of experience," evidence based on statistical
computations of average monthly cost per member could not,
without legislative authorization and over the objection of the
Commissioner, be used as a basis for deferral.87 This decision apparently is determinative of the taxpayer's right to defer prepayments when the taxpayer has incurred a contingent future performance obligation. However, it is suggested that, so limited, the
Court's decision is subject to the same criticism mentioned in connection with the deduction of the estimated expense of contingent
future performance obligations-allowing the form of the transaction to control its substance. 88 As the Court indicated, it is impossible to determine the future time or times the Association
would have to render services on behalf of a member. However,
when the memberships are viewed in the aggregate, an accurate
determination of the portion of the prepaid dues earned within a
given taxable year can be obtained by statistical estimation based
upon past experience. If the purpose of tax accounting is to reflect
income accurately, the Court seemingly should have concerned itself with the accuracy of the Association's estimate of dues which
had been earned. Instead, the Court has apparently prohibited
the use of such estimates without regard to the degree that they
may accurately reflect income. However, Congress expressed dissatisfaction with the Court's result by the enactment of section
456 89 which provided for the deferral of prepaid membership dues.
Speaking specifically to the Court's decision, the congressional committee report expressed approval of deferring prepaid membership
dues because that method of accounting more clearly reflected income than reporting dues in the taxable year received. 9° Consequently, it is not clear what weight will be given to this aspect of
American Automobile Ass'n in future litigation.
In American Automobile Ass'n, the Court announced an addiAmerican Automobile Ass'n v. United States, 367 U.S. 687, 691-93 (1961).
American Automobile Ass'n v. United States, supra note 87, at 691. The Court
continued to distinguish Beacon Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 520 (2d Cir.
1959) and Schuessler v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 722 (5th Cir. 1956) on the ground that
future performance was certain. See American Automobile Ass'n v. United States, supra,
at 691 n.4.
89 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 456, 75 Stat. 222 (1961).
90 H.R. REP. No. 381, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
87
88
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tional reason for its decision which indicated that even if the
taxpayer could show that the deferral of prepayments clearly reflected economic net income, it might nevertheless be rejected for
tax purposes. The apparent denial of any opportunity to defer
"prepaid income" may be found in the Court's construction of
recent legislation. Sections 45291 and 462 92 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954, as originally enacted, contained the first legislative
approval of the deferment of prepayments and the deduction of
estimated future expenses. In 1955, these provisions were retroactively repealed because the estimated loss of revenue attributable
to the newly-enacted provisions would have been much greater
than estimated.93 The Court construed the enactment and repeal
of these sections as indicating a legislative intent that no deferral
of prepayments should be allowed unless specifically authorized.
In strong dictum the Court said:
"[T]he fact is that§ 452 for the first time specifically declared
petitioner's system of accounting to be acceptable for income
tax purposes, and overruled the long-standing position of the
Commissioner and the courts to the contrary. And the repeal
of the section the following year, upon insistence by the
Treasury that the proposed endorsement of such tax accounting would have a disastrous impact on the Government's
revenue, was just as clearly a mandate from the Congress that
petitioner's system was not acceptable for tax purposes." 9 \1
Sections 452 and 462 would have clearly included those areas
which the Court had specifically sought to distinguish. Consequently, it may be argued that, logically, the decision in American
Automobile Ass'n concludes the taxpayer's right to defer prepayments, even where the taxpayer is required to perform his obligation at a fixed future date. This conclusion was further strengthened by the Court's disposition of Schlude v. Commissioner,95
decided in the same term as American Automobile Ass'n. In
Schlude, the Eighth Circuit factually distinguished Automobile
Club v. Commissioner as follows:
"Here, petitioners' obligation to provide services subsequent
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 736, § 452, 68A Stat. 152.
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 736, § 462, 68A Stat. 168.
os Ch. 143, 69 Stat. 134 (1955).
94 American Automobile Ass'n v. United States, 367 U.S. 687, 695 (1961).
ll5 283 F.2d 234 (8th Cir. 1960).
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to the tax year was fixed, definite and certain, thereby effectively rebutting any contention that petitioners' method of
deferral was purely artificial." 96
On appeal, the Supreme Court remanded Schlude for further consideration in the light of its decision in American Automobile
Ass'n.97 After reconsideration, the Eighth Circuit vacated its decision and affirmed the Tax Court since, in the court's language,
petitioners' method of accounting did not, "for income tax purposes, clearly reflect income." 98 The Eighth Circuit had distinguished Schlude from Automobile Club for the same reason that
the Supreme Court had distinguished Beacon and Schuessler from
that case, a distinction that was followed in American Automobile
Ass'n.99 Thus, it would appear from the Second Circuit's earlier
evaluation of the accounting methods used in Schlude that those
methods did not come within American Automobile Ass'n's prohibition against arbitrary deferrals. However, section 452 would
have applied to Schlude's facts; therefore, it may be speculated that,
on remand, the court felt compelled to reject petitioner's accounting methods because of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
legislative history of that section. If this interpretation is deemed
to control tax accounting, it would appear that any further attempt
to apply generally accepted professional accounting methods to
prepayments would be futile. Furthermore, American Automobile
Ass'n may be expected to have a similar effect on situations involving estimated future expenses, as the Court's interpretation of
legislative intent would apply equally to the identical history of
section 462 which had allowed the deduction of such expenses.

III. TAX AccouNTING STANDARDS FOR PREPAID

INCOME

FROM THE SALE OF PROPERTY--AN ANOMALY

Unlike prepayments made in connection with the sale of services or the rental of property, the inclusion of prepayments from
the sale of property must be deferred until the sale has been completed.100 While attempts have been made to distinguish the sale
96
97
98

Id. at 241.

368 U.S. 873 (1961).
Schlude v. Commissioner, 296 F.2d 721, 722 (8th Cir. 1961), cert. granted, 370 U.S.
902 (1962). (Emphasis added.)
99 American Automobile Ass'n v. United States, 367 U.S. 687, 691 n.4 (1961).
100 See, e.g., Virginia Coal &: Coke Co. v. Commissioner, 99 F.2d 919 (4th Cir. 1938);
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of goods from the sale of services based on the nature of the transaction,101 it would seem that the distinction arises from the definition of gross income as used in section 451. "In a manufacturing,
merchandising, or mining business, 'gross income' means the total
sales, less the cost of goods sold ... .'' 102 Consequently, when property is sold, prepayments cannot be included in gross income until
the cost of the property sold can be ascertained and deducted from
gross receipts in order to determine the amount to be included
in the computation of taxable income.103 On the other hand, gross
income from the sale of services or rental of property is equivalent
to the gross receipts from such activities, which must be included
in the computation of taxable income when received.104 This distinction was derived from the apparent requirement that capital
be recovered before an income tax can be imposed.105 However,
under the claim of right doctrine this distinction should have been
insignificant because that doctrine treats funds received under a
claim of right and without restriction as to their disposition as taxable income regardless of the type of transaction from which the
funds are derived. 106 Furthermore, the dissimilar treatment accorded prepayments from the sale of property cannot be sustained
under the reasoning set out in American Automobile Ass'n v. Commissioner,107 which has apparently rejected the claim of right doctrine.108 Section 452 expressly allowed the deferral of prepayments
attributable to the sale of goods and the rental of property.109 ConWoodlawn Park Cemetery, 16 T.C. 1067 (1951); Veenstra &: De Haan Coal Co., 11 T.C.
964 (1948), See also Behren, Prepaid Income-Accounting Concepts and the Tax Law,
15 TAX L. REv. 343, 353 (1960); Goodhue, Claim of Right and Changes in .A.ccounting
Method, N.Y.U. 18rn INST. ON FED. TAX. 209, 214 (1960),

101 Veenstra &: De Haan Coal Co.,
102 Treas. Reg. § l.61-3(a) (1957).

supra note 100.

103 See, e.g., Virginia Coal &: Coke Co. v. Commissioner, 99 F.2d 919 (4th Cir. 1938);
Woodlawn Park Cemetery, 16 T.C. 1067 (1951); Veenstra &: De Haan Coal Co., 11 T.C.
964 (1948); Summit Coal Co,, 18 B.T.A. 983 (1930); Sophia M. Garretson, 10 B.T.A. 1381
(1928). The Commissioner may not anticipate the amount of gross income by deducting
the estimated cost of sales; see Woodlawn Park Cemetery, supra.
104 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 451; Treas. Reg. §§ l.61-2(a)l, l.61-8(a) (1957).
105 Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179 (1918); Hays v. Gauley Mountain Coal
Co., 247 U.S. 189 (1918).
100 See, e.g., James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961) (embezzlement); Rutkin v.
United States, 343 U.S. 130 (1952) (extortion); United States v. Lewis, 340 U.S. 590 (1951)
(bonus paid by mistake).
107 367 U.S. 687, 694-97 (1961).
108 Id. at 701 (dissenting opinion).
100 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, ch. 736 § 452(e)2, 68A Stat, 152.
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sequently, under the Court's interpretation of the legislative intent
manifested by its repeal, prepayments from the sale of goods as well
as the sale of services and the rental of property would seemingly be
includible in the computation of taxable income when received.1l 0
The distinction between the sale of services and the sale of property can raise difficult problems of classification, as illustrated by
the recent case of Wallace A. Moritz, 111 in which a photographer
had received refundable deposits for portraits which were completed and accepted in the following ~axable year. The Tax Court
required the deposits to be included in the current determination
of taxable income on the theory that they were for the rendition
of services rather than the sale of portraits.112 It is probable that
similar problems of classification will be encountered whenever
deposits are received in connection with the sale of products made
to the customer's specifications, an arrangement frequently encountered. It has been suggested that such problems could be
avoided by recognizing that there is no economic difference between the determination of income from the sale of property and
the sale of services or the rental of property and, therefore, no basis
for continuing the present distinction. 113
IV.

THE NEED FOR A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION

Prior to the decision in American Automobile Ass'n the question of acceptable tax accounting methods for prepaid income and
estimated future expenses was considered incapable of resolution. 114
The Commissioner and the Tax Court resisted the introduction
of generally accepted accounting methods regardless of the situation in which the prepayment was received or the estimated future
expense deducted.U 5 The courts of appeals had rendered conflict110 The validity of the dissimilar treatment accorded to prepayments for goods has
been seriously questioned. See Behren, supra note 100, at 354; Goodhue, supra note 100,
at 214-15.
111 21 T.C. 622 (1954).
112 Id. at 624-25.
113 Goodhue, supra note 100, at 215.
114 See generally Behren, supra note 100; Krahmer, Taxation of Advance Receipts
for Future Services, 1961 DuKE L.J. 230.
115 Rev. Rul. 85, 1960-1 Cum. Bull. 181. See, e.g., National Bread Wrapping Mach. Co.,
30 T.C. 550 (1958); E. W. Schuessler, 24 T.C. 247 (1955), rev'd, 230 F.2d 722 (5th Cir.
1956); Wallace A. Moritz, 21 T.C. 622 (1954); Pacific Grape Prods. Co., 17 T.C. 1097
(1952), rev'd, 219 F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 1955); Capital Warehouse Co., 9 T.C. 966 (1947),
afj'd, 171 F.2d 395 (8th Cir. 1948).

1962]

COMMENTS

169

ing decisions. 116 In addition, separate standards prevailed for the
treatment of prepayments from the sale of property and prepayments from the sale of services and rental of property without apparent economic justification.117 The decision in American Automobile Ass'n was based upon alternative grounds. One of these,
dealing with the clarity of accounting procedure used, has been
rejected by Congress. Furthermore, this reasoning did not purport
to control accounting for prepayments and estimated expenses
where non-contingent obligations had been incurred; 118 nor did it
dispose of the apparent anomaly regarding the sale of property.
The other ground, based on legislative intent, would have disposed
of the entire question. However, the Court was careful to discuss
this asserted basis in dictum and restricted its decision to finding
that the Commissioner did not abuse his discretion in rejecting
the Association's accounting system.119 Insofar as the decision was
limited, it cannot fairly be interpreted as resolving prior conflicting
decisions. Thus, the need for legislation governing prepaid income
and estimated future expenses cannot be underestimated. Congressional resolution of these conflicting decisions is necessary to
enable businessmen to make an intelligent choice between competing methods of obtaining payments for goods and services. The
decision in American Automobile Ass'n placed the burden upon
Congress to determine what relief, if any, shall be offered to taxpayers who must account for prepayment or estimated future expenses.120 The Court's failure to take more decisive action is not
entirely unjustified. Many of the underlying policy reasons for and
against the adoption of accounting methods which would allow
the deferral of prepaid income and the deduction of estimated
future expenses are not properly the subject of judicial recognition.121
Cases cited notes 53 & 67 supra.
See text at notes 100·14 supra.
118 See text at notes 89 & 90 supra.
119 American Automobile Ass'n v. United States, 367 U.S. 687, 698 (1961).
120 '"Ve must leave to the Congress the fashioning of a rule which, in any event,
must have wide ramifications." Clark, J., in American Automobile Ass'n v. United States,
supra note 119, at 697.
121 "The Committees of the Congress have standing committees expertly grounded
in tax problems, with jurisdiction covering the whole field of taxation and facilities for
studying considerations of policy as between the various ta.xpayers and the necessities
of the general revenues." Ibid.
116

117
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Effect of Present Tax Accounting Standards

If income is the value added as a result of economic activity, it
is clear that the present tax accounting rules do not in fact measure
income as so defined. Instead, income for tax accounting purposes
is measured from transactions undertaken and completed within
the taxable year, increased by current prepayments for future
services, and decreased by current expenditures incurred in earning prepayments reported in a prior taxable year. Under the present tax accounting standards a new business receiving prepayments incurs a higher tax in its initial year than it would if only
the value added through its operations were measured. An established business which enjoys increasing prepaid sales from year
to year likewise pays a higher tax than would be incurred were it
allowed to measure taxable income under the "value added" concept; conversely, an established business with decreasing prepaid
sales reports less taxable income than it actually earns. If, on the
other hand, the amount of prepaid sales remains fairly constant
from year to year, the present tax accounting standards result in
the same computation of taxable income as would be computed
under a method of accounting designed to measure income according to the "value added" concept.
Although the computation of the total income for the life of
the business will be the same regardless of the accounting method
used, the present rules hinder the organization of new businesses
which receive substantial prepayments.122 These businesses must
obtain additional capital to pay the additional tax they incur under
the present tax accounting standards. It may be argued that the
only hardship is the minimal cost of interest on the additional
funds until the tax has been recaptured through deduction of the
expenses incurred in earning the prepayments. This analysis disregards the possibility that a new business may lack a sufficient
credit standing to enable it to obtain capital for this purpose. A
similar economic hardship is suffered by expanding businesses
which receive sizeable prepayments. Instead of being able to reinvest those funds used to pay the tax increment, the company
must seek additional capital to finance further expansion. Again,
the additional cost factor is limited to interest on the capital ob122 HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS &: MEANS, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., PANEL DISCUSSIONS ON
INCOME TAX REVISION 646, 664 (Comm. Print 1960).
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tained. However, since the additional capital will be needed as
long as the business continues to expand, the cumulative annual
interest charges could become prohibitive. Another adverse effect
that may result from application of the present tax accounting rules
is that individual taxpayers who receive prepayments may incur
a greater total tax than those who do not, even though they may
earn, in the "value added" sense, the same income from year to
year. The difference in their tax burden results from application
of the progressive income tax rates to the distorted income computations made in compliance with present tax accounting standards.
Under these standards, the prepayments may well be taxed at a
higher marginal rate than the marginal rate applicable to the last
increment of income in the year in which the expenses are deducted. A further economic hardship resulting from present tax
accounting rules may be incurred when prepayments are used to
finance the seller's future performance.123 Often this is the only
financing method available. But under the present standards the
unexpended portion of the prepayments is taxed as if it were income; consequently, the attractiveness of financing through prepayments is significantly lessened. It would seem that these claims
of hardship are sufficiently meritorious to indicate clearly the
need for change in the present tax accounting rules. In response
to this need, many authorities have expressed their belief that, as
a solution, generally accepted accounting standards should be
adopted for tax purposes.124
B. Effect of the Adoption of Accounting Standards
The adoption of professional accounting standards for prepayments and estimated future expenses would remove the present
economic disadvantages incurred by taxpayers who have such receipts and expenses. The present Internal Revenue Code has
granted these taxpayers limited relief in only two instances. Sections 455 125 and 456 126 allow the deferral of prepaid subscriptions
123 Id. at 664; PATON 315.
124 Cf. Behren, supra note 100, at 366; Berlfein, Tax vs. Commercial Accounting Considerations in Reserve Accounts, U. So. CAL. 1961 TAX INST. 387, 411; Freeman, Tax
Accrual Accounting for Contested Items, 56 MICH. L. REv. 727, 747 (1958); Krahmer, supra
note 114, at 258. But cf. Schapiro, Tax Accounting for Prepaid Income and Reserves for
Estimated Future Expenses, 2 T.AX REvlsION COMPENDIUM 1133, 1151 (House Ways &:
Means Comm. 1959).
125 INT, REv. CODE OF 1954, § 455. This section codified the decision in Beacon
Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 218 F.2d 697 (10th Cir. 1955).
126 See text at note 89 supra.
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and prepaid membership dues; yet there is no significant economic
difference which distinguishes these receipts from any other forms
of prepayments. Thus, it may be surmised that these provisions
merely indicate a congressional response to well-pleaded individual
hardships.127
The Government has opposed the extension of the advantages
offered by 455 and 456 to taxpayers that do not come within their
limited scope because it would place too great a burden on the
Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service. The burden incurred
by the Treasury would be the loss in revenue that would be sustained because of the change in accounting methods. 128 Although
the loss would be incurred only once, in the taxable year during
which the change in accounting methods occurs, it would be substantial. This prospective loss in revenue resulted in the retroactive repeal of sections 452 and 462 when it was belatedly estimated that the loss might have reached one billion dollars. 129 Also,
allowing deferral of prepayments would obstruct the easy collection
of taxes by making the Treasury stand the risk of the taxpayer's
insolvency.130 This important consideration has led to the enactment of withholding provisions,131 and the requirement of returning estimated tax. 132 Thirdly, it has been argued that the professional accounting standards should not be adopted because it
would unduly burden the Internal Revenue Service with additional administrative problems: 133 the time for the recognition of
advance receipts is not clearly enough defined by professional accounting rules. 134 Finally, a shift to accounting principles has been
resisted on the ground that the collection of taxes should not be
made to depend on such standards because they are inherently conservative, thus tending to underestimate income. 135 Thus, it appears that the Government has valuable interests in the continuation of the present tax accounting standards even though they are
a source of some hardship to the taxpayers who are required to use
them.
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S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1958).
Behren, supra note 100, at 364; Krahmer, supra note 114, at 257.
H.R. REP. No. 293, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1955).
Behren, supra note 100, at 363; Krahmer, supra note 114, at 259.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 3401-04.
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6153.
Behren, supra note 100, at 364; Krahmer, supra note 114, at 258.
Behren, supra note 100, at 364.
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C.

Suggested Resolution of the Conflicting Interests

It is apparent from the Code provisions which allow the deduction of substantially all business expenses that Congress intended
to tax only net business income. 136 Accordingly, the Government
arguably has no legitimate interest in the continued application
of accounting standards which do not accurately measure net income. Although the present tax accounting standards for prepayments and estimated future expenses should for this reason be
abandoned, it does not necessarily follow that the applicable professional accounting methods should be wholly adopted. While
such accounting methods accurately measure net income, they
should be subordinated to the Government's interests in protecting
and insuring adequate sources of revenue. The Government's
needs are illustrated by its interest in collectibility of taxes and ease
in administering the federal tax system.
With respect to the taxation of unearned prepayments, it would
seem that the interests of both Government and taxpayer could best
be protected through the return of an estimated tax on income to
be earned in the performance of future obligations. The idea of
returning estimated tax has proved workable in other situations.137
The assessment of estimated tax would require the taxpayer to
estimate the cost of earning prepayments and deduct this amount
in order to estimate the net income from such transactions. The
estimated expenses should be deducted even though the obligation
to incur them may be contingent or disputed; 138 so long as the estimate of net income is reasonably accurate the interests of the
Government would be fully protected. Once an accurate estimate
of net income is obtained, the problem of determining an appropriate tax rate remains to be resolved. It is suggested that the estimated net income be returned at the marginal rate applicable to
earned income reported in the year the prepayment is received.
This would eliminate the additional problem of guessing the
marginal rate that would be applicable to the estimated income in
the year it is earned. When the income from the prepayments is
actually earned, it would be included in the determination of tax
for that year and a credit would be taken for the estimated tax
136 IlITIKER, FEDERAL INCOME EsrATE AND GIFT TAXATION

REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 6015, 6016.
See text at notes 56 & 57 supra.

137 INT.
138

193 (1958).
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previously paid. This mode of computing net income and the tax
thereon ,is consistent with generally accepted accounting principles
to the eitent that it matches revenues with related expenses. However, where professional accountants would defer the recognition
of income, this method estimates income and returns the tax at the
time the taxpayer receives cash, thus protecting the Government's
interest in collectibility.
The Government's interest in ease of administration could also
be protected under accounting methods which provide for the return of estimated tax. Proper accounting for estimated income
would require the taxpayer to establish a reserve for the expenses
to be incurred. A separate reserve could be established for the unearned prepayments at the end of each taxable year. As these prepayments are earned the expenses incurred would be charged
against the reserve leaving a terminal balance in the reserve, a
feature not found in present reserve accounts. 139 This terminal
balance would indicate the error in the estimate of income, thereby facilitating audit. Since, in a business setting, estimates of the
cost of earning prepayments are made as a normal incident to the
determination of prices and production schedules, it would be
reasonable for the Internal Revenue Service to demand a high
degree of accuracy. As an added impetus to accurate estimation,
taxpayers should be allowed to pay the amount by which the tax
is underestimated without paying any interest or penalty if the
estimate of net income was at least 90 percent of the amount actually earned.140 If the estimate of net income should fall below
90 percent, and there is no evidence of bad faith, the taxpayer
should be allowed to pay the amount by which the tax was underestimated with interest thereon at the statutory rate of six percent.
If the estimate was so inaccurate as to indicate bad faith, the Government should be able to assert its criminal or civil fraud penalties.141 Under such a system of penalties it is hoped that the taxpayer's self-interest would inhibit the deduction of expenses which
are not fairly allocable to earning prepayments. To further ease
the administrative burden, taxpayers should have an adequate cost
139

See, e.g., INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 166(c).
Under present standards the taxpayer incurs no interest obligation if its Estimated
Tax paid equals at least 70% of its actual tax liability. See INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954,
§§ 6654(d), 6655(d).
141 INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 6653.
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accounting system as a prerequisite to returning estimated tax. This
would be necessary to protect the integrity of the terminal balance
as an indicator of errors in estimating income. Where the taxpayer
has obligated itself to deliver a fairly standardized product or
render a standardized service, a cost accounting system based on
process cost or average cost should be sufficiently accurate. On the
other hand, where the taxpayer sells diverse products or services,
a unit cost accounting system may be required.142 A further limitation on the return of estimated tax should be one in terms of time.
Both the Internal Revenue Service and taxpayers would seem to
have an interest in being able to close off transactions of prior years.
Thus, it is suggested that the return of estimated tax on income
from prepayments be denied unless it can be credited against the
taxpayer's tax liability within the present three-year statute of
limitations. 143 Also, once an election to return an estimated tax is
made, the taxpayer should not be able to rescind it without prior
permission of the Commissioner. This would be necessary in order
to prevent the taxpayer from returning to the present accounting
standards in years with fewer prepaid sales in order to reduce his
taxes.
It should be noted that this method of accounting for prepayments is similar to the professional accounting method of handling
estimated future expenses.144 Consequently, it would be consistent
to adopt such accounting standards as are applicable to those expenses. That portion of current receipts which corresponds to
the cost of providing future services would be recognized when
received, with a simultaneous deduction of estimated future expenses.
While this solution is in effect a compromise with generally
accepted principles, since designed to protect the Government's
interests, it also removes much of the economic hardship incurred
under the present rules. Rather than tax the total receipts from
prepayments, only the tax on the estimated net income from such
receipts would have to be returned. Thus, the taxpayer would be
left with the bulk of the cash received and would not have to look
elsewhere to obtain means of financing. Furthermore, since taxpayers receiving prepayments would be taxed on their net income
142 See generally AMORY, ACCOUNTING 530-69
148 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 65Ol(a).
144 See text at notes 23-32 supra.
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when it is actually earned, there would be no possibility that they
might incur greater total taxes than other taxpayers.
To make adoption of this proposed solution economically and
politically feasible it would be necessary to soften the impact of
the loss of revenue that would be incurred due to the change in
accounting methods. The failure to supply an adequate transitional
adjustment resulted in the repeal of sections 452 and 462 of the
1954 Code.145 However, since the loss would be non-recurring, it
would be possible to spread it over a sufficient number of years
to reduce the annual decrease in revenue to manageable proportions.146 Once this obstacle has been overcome, there seems to be
no sufficient reason barring the adoption of an estimated tax on
net income from prepayments and professional accounting standards for estimated future expenses.
Jerome M. Salle, S.Ed.
See text at notes 91-93 supra.
A discussion of the technical aspects of such a device is beyond the scope of
this comment.
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